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In order fully to appreciate the importance of uniformity in
the marriage and divorce laws, we must glance at the present
existing diversity, and even inconsistency therein. Black-
stone's familiar recommendation to consider the old law, the
mischief and the remedy, suggests a convenient and natural
mode of presenting any proposed legal reform. To consider
the subject of this paper somewhat in that order:
I. AS TO THE MARRIAGE LAWS.
I. As to the age of consent. It is well known that the
Common Law rule as to the age of consent; viz., twelve in
the female and fourteen in the male, still exists in many States
-even in the older and presumably the more conservative
and thoughtful communities.
It may seem singular that in the northern and colder climate
of England the period of lawful marriage should be the same as
that of the warmer continental countries, but it was perhaps
introduced from the Civil Law. Even in Massachusetts, a
commonwealth not backward in adopting every measure that
* Read at the World's Congress of Jurisprudence and Law Reform, at
Chicago, August 7, 1893.
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may improve and elevate her people, and under whose glorious
institutions it is a blessed privilege to live, the age of consent
is still that above stated; and a marriage solemnized before a
magistrate between two children above those ages respectively
is legal and valid, even without consent of their parents or
guardians; and this notwithstanding a statute of that State
prohibits ministers or magistrates from solemnizing a marriage
between persons of such age without such consent, under a
heavy penalty; such prohibition being considered to apply
only to the minister and not to the contract. Some years ago
a young girl, only thirteen years of age, named Sarah Hervey,
was enticed away from her widowed mother's house by a
young fellow, named Parton, of bad character and dissolute
habits, who by false representations as to the age of the girl,
procured a marriage license, and persuaded a magistrate to
formally marry them. She returned to the house of her
mother, who forbade the young man to see her. Upon his
petition against the mother for writ of habeas corpus, the
Supreme Court of the commonwealth, after full consideration,
ordered the young wife to be surrendered to the husband, and
he bore her away in triumph: Partot v. Hervcy, I Gray, 119
(1854). The mother then brought suit against a confederate
of the husband, who had aided in enticing away the girl and
in practicing the fraud upon the magistrate who solemnized
the marriage, but the mother again failed in her efforts to
vindicate her rights to protect her daughter, since it distinctly
appeared that the marriage was with the daughter's full and
free consent: Hervey v. .foseley, 7 Gray, 479 (1856).
If I am rightly informed, the same lamentable results might
occur in many, if not in a majority of the United States. Not
long since, two young girls, aged fourteen and sixteen, at a
dancing party in Buffalo, met two youths, but little older
than themselves, who, under the excitement of the occasion,
proposed they should get married "just for the fun of the
thing." They did so, and a few days later, the young wife
came before a magistrate and obtained an order to commit
her husband to jail, because of his refusal to support her.
To allow this most important of all relations in.life to be
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irrevocably entered into before the characters of the parties
are formed, their tastes developed, or their judgment matured,
before their natural fitness or unfitness for each other can pos-
sibly be predicted even by their most intimate friends, not
only leads to many unhappy marriages, but soorrer or later
naturally lands the parties in the divorce court. Conse-
quently many States, impressed with the dangers surrounding
these precocious unions, have raised the marriageable age,
some to sixteen in the female and eighteen in the male. But
it is doubtful whether even this is adequate, and the new State,
Washington, has advanced the age to eighteen and twenty-
one respectively. Uniformity here and in the other essentials
of marriage is not only desirable but imperative. Eighteen
and twenty-one are none too high as a general rule, although
under some unfortunate circumstances marriage at a less age
seems the wisest thing.
2. As to the publication of banns, or obtaining of license.
To prevent secret and clandestine marriages some means are
all important. Publication of banns, as an essential pre-
requisite, is one of the best preventives ever adopted. It
ought to be restored. The next best remedy is the filing of a
previous application with the town-clerk, or some other officer,
and obtaining from him an official certificate or license. Such
application ought to contain the written consent of the parents.
or guardians of both parties, if they be under age; and be
made so long prior to the time of the proposed marriage cere-
mony that friends and relatives may be informed thereof, and
be allowed to interpose objections, if such exist.
Many States 'have no preventive or check against secret
marriages, and substantial uniformity might well be adopted
to secure such a safeguard. Some States now provide that
parents and friends may intervene and make written objections
to a magistrate, and have a public hearing on the fitness of
the marriage, which may be then forbidden by the officer, if
he sees fit.
3. As to the solemnization of the marriage. At present
a majority of States hold valid the so-called Common Law
marriage ; i. e., merely a private contract between the parties,
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to consider themselves thenceforth as husband and wife;
especially where such agreement is followed by cohabitation.
This method of marriage requires no writing, no witness, no
magistrate or minister, no publication, and no information to
family, relatives, or friends. Could anything be fraught with
more danger ?
In most States the statutes declaring how marriages shall
be solemnized are considered directory merely. A marriage
according to the Common Law, without complying with such
directions, is held valid, unless the statutes clearly and posi-
tively assert all other marriages to be null and void.
Thus, although the law of Pennsylvania declared "All mar-
riages shall be solemnized by taking each other for husband
and wife before twelve sufficient witnesses," it was still held
that a marriage not in the presence of so many witnesses was
not for that reason invalid: Rodebaugl v. Sanks, 2 Watts, 9
(1833).
So, in Missouri, it has always been considered that a Com-
mon Law marriage is good, though not in conformity to the
statutory requirements, unless the statutes contain express
words of nullity: Dyer v. Brannock, 66 Mo. 391; 27 Am. R.
359 (1877). And although the statute says, "Previous to any
marriage in this State, a license for that purpose shall be
* obtained from the officer therein authorized to issue the
same," nevertheless a marriage by consent in presence of
witnesses is valid, without obtaining any license, and without
any minister or officer being present: State v. Bittick, 103 Mo.
183 (1890).
The statute of Alabama uses still stronger language, declar-
ing positively that " No marriage shall be solemnized without
a license issued by the judge of probate of the county where
the female resides," but the highest court of Alabama holds a
marriage perfectly good without any license at all: Campzbell v.
Gullatt, 43 Ala. 57 (1869).
Kentucky, North Carolina, Georgia, Louisiana, New Hamp-
shire, and other States, adopt similar constructions : Stevenson
v. Gray, 17 B. Monroe, Ky. 193 (1856); State v. Robbins, 6
Iredell's N. C. Rep. 13 (1845); Askew v. Dupree, 30 Ga. 173
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(1860); Holmes v. Holmcs, 6 La. 463 (1833); Londonderyy v.
Chestel, 2 N. H. 268 (1820).
In the Empire State, on whose banner floats that lofty word
"Excelsior," it is familiar learning that the statutes requiring
solemnization before a minister, priest, or magistrate in the
presence of witnesses, are .only directory, and for the purpose
of securing registration; and that for all other purposes mar-
riages are valid without such celebration and attestation. All
the New York law requires is a competency to contract and an
actual contract between the parties themselves: Hayes v. The
People, 25 N.Y. 390 (1862).
A few years since, a widower, the father of several children,
a few weeks after his wife's death, entered his seamstress's
bedroom at night, and proposed to marry her, saying it would
not answer to do so publicly, on account of the very recent
death of his wife and the opposition of his family, but that it
would be a perfectly lawful and valid marriage if they both
then agreed to consider themselves as husband and wife.
After some remonstrances she finally yielded. Unwilling to
keep her longer in his own house, he sent her to another city,
where she resided under an assumed name and had several
children by him. Upon his death, some years afterwards, she
set up a claim for herself and her children to a portion of his
property, in common with the children of his first wife; and
upon her testimony alone her claim was established, notwith-
standing that his first wife's children offered to prove that
their father had always denied that he had ever married again:
Van Tui'l v. Man TzIyl, 57 Barb. 235 (1869); see, also, Bissell
v. Bissell, 55 Barb. 325 (1869).
On the other hand, a few States have had the moral
courage to adopt and declare a "higher law " on this subject,
and hold that where a statute clearly declares how a marriage
may be solemnized, it impliedly forbids a marriage in any
materially different way, although such statute contains no
express and positive prohibition or declaration of the invalidity
of marriages solemnized otherwise than as the statute provides.
Tennessee seems entitled to the credit of first announcing
and positively applying this doctrine. In 1829 the Supreme
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Court of that State, in a very careful and elaborate opinion,
decided that the statutory provisions as to how marriages
might be solemnized superseded all Common Law marriages,
and that a marriage solemnized before a justice of the peace
out of his own county and where he had no authority, though
formal and legal in other respects, was absolutely null and
void: Bashaw v. The State, i Yerger, 177 (1829), and this
was fully affirmed two years later in Grisham v. The State, 2
Yerg. 589 (1831).
The code of Maryland provides that the rites of marriage
shall not be celebrated by any person within the State unless
by some ordained minister, or in such manner as is used and
practiced by the society of Quakers; also that no person
shall marry within the State without first obtaining a license
directed to a minister or other person qualified by law to
celebrate a marriage in this State, nor until after banns pub-
lished in some house of religious worship, or by a minister, as
therein directed. It further prescribes a penalty upon parties
going out of the State to marry contrary to the provisions of
the act. But the statute contains no express prohibition or
declaration of absolute nullity of marriages contracted other-
wise than as therein provided. Under the existence of this
law two respectable persons agreed to take each other as
husband and wife. They lived publicly as such for several
years, and were treated and reputed to be such among their
friends and ac4uaintances. After the man's death the wife set
up a claim to a share of his property, but it was held that the
alleged marriage was null and void, and that to constitute a
valid marriage in Maryland some religious ceremony must be
superadded to the civil contract: Denison v. Denison, 35 Md.
361 (1871).
The statutes of Massachusetts enact (Pub. Sts. c. 145, § 22)
that a marriage may be solemnized by a justice of the peace,
or by a minister of the gospel ordained according to the
usage of his denomination, etc., but nowhere expressly declare
other marriages invalid. In 1879, a minister of the Second
Advent denomination, at a public religious meeting in
Worcester, at which about fifty persons were present, read a
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few verses from Matt. xx., and a young lady in the con-
gregation did the same, after which they joined hands, and
declared that in the presence of God and these witnesses they
took each other to be husband and wife, " till death do us
part." There was no other ceremony or solemnization, and
no magistrate or other minister was present as such, though
a marriage license had been duly issued. Believing that they
were thus lawfully married, the parties subsequently cohabited
together as man and wife. Upon an indictment against the
man for lewd and lascivious cohabitation, the marriage was
held null and void in an exhaustive opinion by Chief Justice
Gray, although the conviction was set aside on another point:
Commonwealth v. Mtunson, 127 Mass. 459 (1879). The same
view had previously been taken in England: Beamish v.
Beamish, 9 H. L. C. 274 (1861). And see iVocross v. Aror-
ooss, 155 Mass. 425 (1892).
The statute of West Virginia (Code of 1868, c. 63) provides
for the issuing of a license, the persons by whom and the
manner in which marriages may be solemnized. It further
declares that marriages shall not be void if celebrated without
a license, nor if in good faith solemnized before a person pro-
fessing to be authorized, though not so; but it contains no
other saving clauses. Under this act it was recently held that
a Common La-w marriage, by mutual consent, without any
license and without solemnization before any officer either de
jure or de facto was not valid: Beve,-lin v. Bever/in, 29 W. Va.
732 (1887).
In the new State of Washington, it is also held that the
statutes directing how marriages may be solemnized impliedly
prohibit all other marriages, and that a Common Law marriage
is void: JeLazf.igdin's Estate, 30 Pac. Rep. 651 (1892). Such,
also, has been declared to be the law of Oregon: Hohmes v.
Hohmes, I Abb. Cir. Ct. 525 (1870).
The statutes of Pennsylvania, Alabama and Missouri, above
referred to, are far more prohibitory in their language than
those of Massachusetts, Maryland and West Virginia, yet in
the former States the statutes are held to be only directory
and not important, while in the latter they are mandatory, and
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non-compliance is fatal. When in some States "shall" means
" may," and in others "may " means " shall," under exactly the
same circumstances, is it not time to seek for some method of
correcting this incongruity ?
4. A valuable contributor to Bedora's _1onily-Mr.Walter
Stowe Collins-has recently demonstrated the need of reform
in defining the degrees of marriageable kindred. At present
many marriages are valid in oneState and incestuous in
others. At present two brothers living in the same city on
the border line of adjoining States may marry two sisters,
in their respective States, and the children of one are legiti-
mate; those of the other not. In one State the parents are
honored and respected; in the other both may be condemned
as felons. Do such inconsistencies increase our respect for law,
either moral or civil ? What limit of relationship should be
established is open to discussion, but it would seem that at
least no relatives nearer than first cousins should be allowed
to marry. A painful case recently occurred in Maryland,
when a lady and her nephew went to New York to be married,
because the law of that State permits it, intending to return
and reside in Maryland. But it must be at the risk of criminal
prosecution.
Thus, from what has been before said, it will be seen that
on three or four very important points in the marriage law a
striking difference exists in the various States. It may not be
desirable or practicable to establish uniformity in all the details
relating to the marriage ceremony, but certainly some improve-
ment in the fundamentals involved is worthy of our best efforts.
We ought to aim at unity in essentials, even if we permit variety
in non-essentials.
II. As TO THE DIVORCE LAWS.
As to the causes for divorce. Here the diversity is so great,
it seems hopeless to expect entire uniformity, however desira-
ble it may be. We can hardly expect that South Carolina
with no legal ground for divorce, will adopt the law of Ken-
tucky with seventeen, nor that Kentucky will abolish all her
present divorce laws to conform to South Carolina. Either
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some middle ground must be adopted or uniformity is impos-
sible. Neither is it probable that all States will agree to only
one cause as sufficient; for only a very few States now limit
divorces to cases of adultery. If uniformity here is obtain-
able at all, it can only be, on a few fundamental and clear
violations of the marriage law, such as adultery, absolute and
wilful desertion, extreme and intolerable cruelty endangering
life or health, and perhaps one or two others.
But if uniformity in causes of divorce is unattainable, it
seems to be perfectly practical in many other important points
in the administration of divorce laws. Thus a uniform law
might require a longer bona fide residence of the applicant in
the State where the application is made. It now varies from
five years in Massachusetts to sixty days in one State, unless
the time has recently been extended.
Requiring actual notice to the respondent whenever possi-
ble, is also a great safeguard against fraud and imposition,
which may easily be secured by some more uniform legisla-
tion. Authorizing a court to make a decree of divorce (when
no notice is actually given to the respondent), to take effect
after the lapse of six months, with a power to apply to set it
aside within that time, is also a step in the same direction of
security for the accused party, and a safeguard against fraud
and imposition upon the Court.
These and other considerations lead us to three conclusions:
(I) That more uniformity in the general principles of mar-
riage and divorce laws is essential to our best interests.
(2) That entire uniformity in details, even if practicable, is
not absolutely necessary.
(3) That the evils of non-uniformity may, to a great extent,
be prevented by appropriate legislation.
III. IF UNIFORMITY IS DESIRABLE, How CAN IT BE
ACCOMPLISHED?
Only two ways are possible; viz., either by the act of Con-
gress, or by that of the several States.
The first requires an amendment of the Constitution,
enlarging the powers of Congress so as to embrace marriage
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and divorce in the eighth section. But such an amendment
has many difficulties to encounter. In the first place it must,
in the language of the Constitution, be " deemed necessary
by two-thirds of both Houses, and be proposed by Congress,
or by a convention called by Congress upon the application of
the legislatures of two-thirds of the several States. Second,
it must be ratified by the legislatures of three-fourths of the
several States, or by conventions in three-fourths thereof, as
Congress may determine. In order to secure uniformity by
this method, two controversies must be waged and two vic-
tories won. In the first place, three-fourths of the State leg-
islatures and a majority of both Houses of the national Con-
gress, as also the President of the United States, must be con-
vinced that uniformity, and the proposed uniformity, is in and
of itself desirable; in the second place, that it is wise to
amend the Constitution, and vest the power of establishing
uniformity in the Federal government. Some of the ardent
friends of the first proposition are opposed to the last, while
many more are lukewarm or doubtful of its expediency. The
objection is not without force, that if the control of the sub-
ject of marriage and divorce may be wisely transferred to the
national Congress, so equally well may many others, such as
the law of wills and inheritance, the laws of descent and dis-
tribution, etc.
On the other hand, it is easier to persuade forty-four States
to establish uniformity by separate action than it is to induce
thirty-three States to surrender the whole subject to the con-
trol of the Federal government. Besides, much success
would be attained in the latter method of individual State
action, even if all the States did not at first adopt the uniform
legislation. If thirty-three did so, their example, if uniformity
proved beneficial, would sooner or later induce the rest to
follow in their footsteps.
If, therefore, this problem of uniformity is to be worked out
in the several States, how may it be accomplished ? One
important step looking toward that direction has already been
taken. Several States have appointed commissioners to meet
together and take this subject into consideration, and propose
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some scheme or plan of uniformity in the most important
social subjects. They have had several meetings, and have
already formulated several propositions looking towards uni-
formity on this and. other subjects. They are waiting for the
appointment of commissioners from still other States, with-
whom they may confer before pressing their recorftiendatibns
for adoption. If the labors of these commissions shall prove
satisfactory, much good will be accomplished in securing
uniformity, or at least in remedying the evils arising from non-
uniformity; on the other hand, if this effort proves a failure
we see no remedy for the constantly increasing evils of our
present situation.
Edmund H. Bennett.*
Boston, August 1, 1893.
* This paper having been prepared and read nearly three years since,
sonic changes may have in the meantime been made in the laws of some
States, for which the reader will make due allowance.
